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ANTITRUST POLICY IN DISTRIBUTION 
Kendall B. DeBevoise* 
T HE American genius lies quite as much in distribution as in man-ufacturing. Other peoples have demonstrated equal or greater 
creative ability in many fields. And it is debatable whether their 
talents are any less at mass production given adequate economic de-
mand. But they have nowhere shown the American genius for dis-
tribution. It is axiomatic that if you manufacture in Detroit and your 
potential customer lives in New York, you need mutual friends. We 
seem to have figured out better ways to provide better friends for 
this purpose than any other nation. 
But manufacturing came first. Someone had to build a mousetrap 
and someone then had to build a better one. Only then did it become 
apparent that the adage isn't necessarily true-that the mere fact of 
a better mousetrap is no guarantee of beaten paths-and that even the 
better mousetraps must be moved out to make room for more. 
Our antitrust laws followed the same chronological pattern. Con-
gress first, in 1890, sought to control unbridled power in the manu-
facturing field.1 In 1914, it sought to extend that control to distribu-
tion-but, principally, distribution as practiced by manufacturers.2 In 
1936, when distribution had become a separate giant with a mind of 
its own, Congress sought to control it at the distributive levels as 
well.3 
It might seem, therefore, that the statutory evolution was as logical 
and consequential as the business evolution. But it has just not proved 
out. There is only a seeming parallel between an original effort to 
prevent manufacturers from cartelizing or monopolizing in order to 
insure fair and aggressive competition and a subsequent effort to hold 
myriad forms of distributive organizations in fair competition. What 
the vast majority of our people believe is the secret of our economic 
health in manufacturing had not proved in 1936, nor has it since, 
to be as fully the legal answer to the problems of distribution. 
The Attorney General's Committee is acutely, if at times mutely, 
aware of this.4 The committee members, too, are chronological in 
,. Member, New York Bar.-Ed. 
l Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1952) 
§§1-7. 
2 Clayton Act, 38 Stat. L. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§12-27. 
3 Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, 49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. 
(1952) §§13, 13a, 13b. 
4 This critique is addressed solely to chapter IV of the REPORT OF THB ATTORNEY 
GENERA.L's NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITnusT LAws, March 31, 1955 
(hereinafter cited as REPORT, followed by the page number). 
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their thinking. In the beginning was the Sherman Act, and it was 
good. Later came the Clayton Act, and it was good, but no matter 
what additional purposes it may have had, it should be read in the 
full light of the Sherman Act. Later came the Robinson-Patman Act, 
hard after a tragic depression and, on a different economic theory, 
addressed to different economic problems. The committee had to 
fish or cut bait. 
I submit that i~ cut bait. But its choices were difficult. It could 
disapprove of the Robinson-Patman Act as being unwise and un-
American for sponsoring soft competition. It could recommend elim-
ination of the act from the body of antitrust laws as such but, some-
what like interstate transportation and communication, advocate leg-
islative and administrative controls outside the strictly antitrust field 
to curb conceded evils in specific areas of distribution. It could rec-
ommend retention of the act's philosophy but with extensive legis-
lative overhaul in the light of its textual ambiguities. It could read 
and interpret the act strictly without regard to legislative inconsistency 
over a period of half a century. Or, it could attempt to harmonize by 
interpretation what Congress, wjthout-too much aim at harmony, has 
thus far legislated. 
The committee has chosen the latter route in chapter IV, the 
portion of its very comprehensive report dealing with distribution.5 
Whether that is wise or not will unquestionably be debated for some 
time to come, and very frequently, it is feared, on a predicate of whose 
ox is gored. But it does seem important, in any analysis of this part 
of the committee's Report, that the reader be fully aware of the 
Sherman Act philosophy with which the committee has approached 
our existing laws covering distribution. Moreover, the members of 
the committee are reasonable men-they very sincerely believe in the 
Rule of Reason (the interpretive cornerstone of the Sherman Act).6 
They have sought to find a harmonious antitrust whole in the laws 
as they stand today by returning to the philosophy of Sherman es-
pecially as applied under the Rule of Reason, Professor Louis B. 
Schwartz to the contrary notwithstanding.7 
5 REPORT 129-221. 
6 This rule of Sherman Act construction was first enunciated in Standard Oil Co. 
of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502 (1911). 
7 Jt would appear from the Report that Professor Schwartz of the committee takes 
violent issue with this approach. In his general dissent, at p. 392, he says, "One can have 
more uncertainty and fewer per se rules, or less uncertainty and more per se rules. Anti-
trust critics will have to make a choice." His choice appears to be per se illegality as 
against the Rule of Reason in practically every instance. 
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Thus, at the outset,8 the Report notices that these "ambiguities 
and conllicts have not escaped judicial notice." It recalls that the 
Supreme Court itself has found it difficult "to 'reconcile, in its entirety, 
the economic theory which underlies the Robinson-Patman Act with 
that of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.' " But, as the committee reads 
the cases, "judicial process has evolved one fundamental accommoda-
tion to protect competitive distribution-resolution of every statutory 
doubt in favor of the Sherman Act's basic antitrust directives." And, 
having come to this conclusion, the committee says, "we accept the 
views expressed by the Supreme Court accommodating all legal restric-
tions on the distribution process to dominant Sherman Act policies." 
This approach, then, underlies a very ably written discussion of 
the topics which follow. Because of it, few affirmative legislative 
recommendations appear. Rather is the general result a well-intended 
and well-executed lecture on how, hopefully, the law should be inter-
preted administratively and judicially. And no matter how it may he 
received in various quarters, it constitutes, for the practitioner, the 
completest yet most compact hornbook on the subject now available. 
A. REFUSALS TO DEAL 
Refusals to deal are not governed, as such, by any specific anti-
trust provision, which may account for much of the confusion in this 
area. It is not at all unusual to find well-informed businessmen who 
believe that any refusal to deal violates "those antitrust laws of yours." 
The Report does much to clarify the status of refusals to deal. 
While they must be measured for legality against the Sherman, Clay-
ton and Federal Trade Commission Acts, they are generally safe from 
antitrust if not conceived in combination or conspiracy. Combination 
boycotts have long been condemned. But even more deeply rooted in 
our law and tradition is the concept of a competitive market in which 
buyers and sellers are free to associate or disassociate as individual dis-
cretion dictates. 
While all agree that the antitrust laws block co~bination refusals 
to deal9 (except in the excluded field of labor), it also is clear that 
they place numerous restrictions on individually conceived refusals. 
When done for monopolistic ends (Sherman), or with resulting lack 
8 REPORT 131-132. 
9 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Assn. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 34 S.Ct. 
951 (1914); Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 
U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 703 (1941); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 
65 S.Ct. 661 (1945). 
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of "proportionally equal" treatment (Robinson-Patman), they may 
be vulnerable. The committee, with considerable caution, sees 
danger ( Clayton Act, section 3) in an implication that those not cut 
off by a seller may, by that token, have tacitly agreed to exclude the 
seller's competitors. 
Again, the committee points out that the Federal Trade Com-
mission has often used section 5 of its organic act to reach a pattern 
of refusals which smacked of resale price maintenance.10 Since, how-
ever, as a practical business matter, price cutting is more often than 
not the reason behind a refusal to deal, widespread use of section 5 
on this theory could leave _little or nothing of the basic right of refusal 
asserted by the committee. On other pages in other connections, 
the committee has given more battle to Trade Commission theory. 
It may here have been caught in a philosophical conflict of its own-
between the virtue of a free market and the Sherman Act vice of 
resale price maintenance. 
Nevertheless, the Report does find that "an appropriate balance" 
has been achieved judicially between individual freedom and protec-
tion from trade restraint. This seems to be a sound conclusion as of 
the date of the Report. 
B. EXCLUSIVE DEALING 
Typical arrangements within the category of exclusive dealing 
run the gamut from outright illegality to questionable legality. As 
in the case of combination boycotts, little can be said for "tying" 
arrangements. They have been held many times to violate section 
3 of the Clayton Act and the committee has no quarrel. It notes 
that the original goodwill exemption has now been confined to those 
specific situations in which restrictions are indispensable for pro-
tection. Beyond that, the Supreme Court has said flatly, in the 
Times-Picayune case,11 that tying arrangements are illegal whenever 
the supplier "enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for the 
'tying' product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the 'tied' 
product is restrained. . . ." 
The committee is less satisfied with the law as it applies to ex-
clusive arrangements or, more particularly, with the Standard Stations 
case,12 a "5 to 4 decision by the Supreme Court" accompanied by "a 
10 See cases cited, REPORT 136, n. 30. . 
11 Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594-at 608, 73 S.Ct. 872 
(1953). . . 
12 Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 69 S.Ct. 1051 
(1949). 
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perplexing opinion whose rationale is not clear."13 The committee 
faces this decision bravely not only in its own "exclusive dealing" 
context but elsewhere wherever the statutory phrase "substantial lessen-
ing of competition" requires analysis. 
It will be recalled that in the Standard Stations case requirements 
contracts covering sixteen percent of the existing retail gasoline stations 
in the 'Western Area" were held to violate section 3 because they 
"foreclosed competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce 
affected." This has become known as the "quantitative substantiality" 
test as distinguished from one which looks directly at the actual or 
probable economic effect in that particular market under its prevailing 
circumstances: The committee wants none of it. 
This is not to say that the committee feels that all requirements 
contracts are lawful. It is to say that the committee, as avowed ad-
vocates of the Rule of Reason, would in each case examine market 
effect rather than postulate per se illegality wherever the quantity of 
commerce involved appears substantial. This necessarily sets the com-
mittee off on a somewhat different tack from its approach to "tying" 
arrangements, for there, as noted, it feels that "a relatively narrow 
inquiry" is sufficient. 
Where coverage is substantial, the committee concludes: all tying 
arrangements are bad (see Times-Picayune); only some requirements 
contracts are (don't see Standard Stations). The Report points out, 
realistically, that requirements contracts may often be preferred by 
customers to assure source of supply, that they often fortify the com-
petitive position of newcomers and weaker concerns in the market. 
But it concedes that some requirements contracts could be as objection-
able as a tying arrangement. Its position, therefore, is this: 
"In our view, the mere coverage of a substantial volume of 
commerce by exclusive dealing arrangements, while a factor to be 
considered, is not tantamount to 'foreclosure' of rivals from access 
to a substantial market, so that some analysis of particular distribu-
tive patterns is essential to any determination of actual fore-
closure."14 
But how to get around Standard Stations? The committee resorts 
to a not altogether succ~sful tour de force. It points out that since 
that decision, the Federal Trade Commission has voluntarily taken 
the "actual foreclosure" approach in preference to the Supreme Court's 
13 REPORT 141. 
14 REPORT 147. 
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"quantitative substantiality."15 It then says ih effect that what is good 
for the commission is good for the courts. 
''\Ve do not understand Standard Stations to suggest that 
Congress envisaged the parallel enforcement of the statute by 
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
to rely on disparate legal principles, depending solely on whether 
the initial adjudication is rendered by a judicial or an administra-
tive tribunal."16 
Where this leaves the matter is the reader's guess. If the Federal 
Trade Commission were to reverse £eld and apply the Standard Stations 
rule (which it has every right to do), would this part of the Report 
become a wilderness voice? Without legislative recommendation of any 
kind, this part is little more than a lawyer's brief on one side of a very 
real question. 
C. R.EsALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND "FAIR TRADE" 
The committee's position on "Fair Trade" is quite the clearest in 
this chapter, if not in the entire Report. The committee is. against it, 
and would do something about it. It would repeal the federal en-
abling statutes, Miller-Tydings17 and McGuire.18 
It could have taken no other position consistent with its conviction 
that Sherman Act philosophy should prevail in the laws of distribution. 
For fair trade has twice been made an express statutory exception to 
that philosophy. It is price fixing in an otherwise free price area. It 
is the one safe island in a sea of per se illegality where even the Rule 
of Reason finds no place. 
The committee has powerful friends at court. Both the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission are for repeal.19 
But it has enemies in retailers' and manufacturers' groups who reason-
ably seek protection of good will against price cutting and "loss leader" 
selling. The committee has a large portion of the judiciary in its 
camp, but, judging from past performance, it has the majority of 
Congress against it. 
The committee itself was not unanimous. A minority of the 
members feel that there must be statutory treatment of problems like 
loss leader sales and debasement of business good will. Especially do 
15 The Maico Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 5822 (1953). 
16 ful'ORT 148. 
17 Miller-Tydings Act, amending §1 of the Sherman Act, 50 Stat. L. 693 (1937), 
15 u.s.c. (1952) §1. 
18 McGuire Act, amending §5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 52 Stat. L. 111 
(1938), 15 u.s.c. (1952) §45. 
19 ful'ORT 153, n, 90. 
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they fear that repeal would adversely affect the small businessman. 
It is submitted that the committee omitted the strongest reason for 
the repeal of fair trade in its present form. It doesn't work. 
D. PrucE DISCRIMINATION 
The vast field of commercial transactions which the Robinson-
Patman Act controls has quite logically been subdivided by the com-
mittee according to the problems and questions which arise most 
frequently rather than according to the sections of the act as such. 
1. The Prerequisite of "Goods of Like Grade and Quality" 
Section 2(a) applies only to discriminations "between different 
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality." Unlike "cost 
justification" and "good faith meeting of competition," which are 
affirmative defenses to a prima facie case of illegal price discrimination, 
this provision determines whether the act is applicable in the first 
instance. If the differential prices were for commodities of unlike 
grade and quality, section 2(a) simply does not apply and there can 
be no subsequent occasion for raising the affirmative defenses avail-
able under the act. 
The committee points out that there have been very few judicial 
or administrative interpretations of "like grade and quality." To the 
extent that there have been, it seems clear today that mere differences 
in brand names and labels, or nominal physical differences not affect-
ing functional utility, or different size packaging and methods of 
packaging will not render the goods unlike in grade and quality within 
the meaning of the act.20 Indeed, recently, the Federal Trade Com-
mission has held that a grocery pack of coffee is of the same grade and 
quality as an institutional pack even though the latter contained an 
additional type of coffee bean which gave it a staying power lacking 
in the other .and was packaged differently and in different sizes.21 
The committee believes that these interpretations are sound but, 
more important, that it is a mistake to dwell too long on this question 
in a price discrimination case. Its point is well taken. It recognizes 
that there are economic factors inherent in brand names and national 
advertising which create a necessary differential in consumer accept-
ance. Brand name goods often command a significant premium over 
20 REPORT 157. Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove Co., (8th Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 768; 
Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., (D.C. Fla. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 985; Goodyear Tire 
and Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232 at 290 (1936); Sylvania Electric Products, F.T.C. Docket 
No. 5728 (1953). 
21 General Foods Cor:p., F.T.C. Docket No. 6018 (1955), 3 CCH TRADB R.Ec. REP. 
'Jl25,379. 
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private "economy" brands in the market place. And, under the lan-
guage of the act, such economic differences, if demonstrable, can be 
said to bear on the question of "like grade and quality." The com-
mittee recommends, however, that rather than explore them in an 
initial jurisdictional inquiry, these economic factors should be evalu-
ated under the "more flexible 'injury' and 'cost justification' provisions 
of the statute." If economic differences are demonstrable, the seller's 
price differentials may well have caused no injury to competition or 
may well be cost justified through equivalent savings in advertising 
and promotion. The committee's view is entirely consistent with its 
basic approach to the entire subject of distribution in that it again 
places emphasis on the actual effect in the competitive market with, 
of course, the Rule of Reason hovering in the background. The com-
mittee sums up: 
"Both these_ potential defenses should be evaluated by the 
Commission in any preliminary investigation. In this way, a 
strict interpretation of the statutory phrase 'like grade and quality' 
can facilitate Federal Trade Commission enforcement while yield-
ing realistic results in practice."22 
While the Federal Trade Commission may believe that consumer 
preferences should be examined only under the "cost justification" 
provision, it seems likely, nevertheless, that the commission will favor 
the strict interpretation of the phrase recommended by the committee 
since it will raise less question as to the commission's jurisdiction in 
the first instance. 
2. Competitive "Injury," and Proof of Prima Facie Violation of the 
Price Discrimination Law 
For some years, the mere fact of differential pricing alone made 
out a prima facie case under section 2(a) of the act. It may still in 
the influential Second Circuit where, as late as 1951, the court of 
appeals reiterated its surprising Moss holding23 that the burden of 
disproving injury is on any seller shown to have granted differential 
prices. 
22 lli!PORT 159. 
23 Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 
378; Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Brands, Inc., (2d Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 510. 
24 Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (7th Cir. 
1951) 191 F. (2d) 786. 
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But the committee feels that the subsequent Minneapolis-Honey-
well24 decision of the Seventh Circuit and the Automatic Canteen25 
decision of the Supreme Court (although the latter involved the 
buyer's, not seller's, burden) have isolated and immunized the Moss 
case. And it points to the Federal Trade Commission's recent Gen-
eral Foods decision in which it is avowed that in a price discrimination 
case "'counsel supporting the complaint has the burden of proof to 
establish the necessary . . . injury.' "26 Indeed, the commission dis-
closed that the court of appeals, in the Moss case, had volunteered a 
principle which the commission's attorneys had never urged upon 
that court. 
What then is the necessary injury which the commission concedes 
it must establish? It is not as clear that the commission and the com-
mittee would agree on this,27 although the commission is placing in-
creased emphasis on actual economic impact on the market.28 
The committee suggests "that analysis of the statutory 'injury' 
[must] center on the vigor of competition in the market rather than 
hardship to individual businessmen." This, it will be recalled, is 
the characteristic resolution by the committee of any conflict between 
Sherman and Robinson-Patman. The conflict is between hard com-
petition and soft competition, and the soft must accommodate. 
"Incidental hardships on individual businessmen in the nor-
mal course of commercial events can be checked by a price 
discrimination statute only at the serious risk of stifling the 
competitive process itself ."29 
And the reconciliation: 
"Such a view comports with the text of Section 2(a). We 
emphasize that it is not 'injury' to competitors but adverse effects 
on 'competition with' parties privy to discriminations that the 
statute expressly forbids. Hence we believe that criteria of com-
petitive effect which focus exclusively on individual competitors' 
sales or profits rather than the health of the competitive process 
literally go beyond the terms of the law."30 
25 Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 346 U.S. 61, 
73 S.Ct. 1017 (1953). 
26 REPORT 162, quoting General Foods Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 5675 (1954), 3 CCH 
TRADE REc. REP. iI25,069 at p. 35,212. 
27 See the position taken by the Federal Trade Commission in Minneapolis-Honeywell 
Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948), but reversed (7th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 786. 
2s E.G., Maico Corp., F.T.C. Docket No. 5622 (1953); Pillsbury Mills Corp., F.T.C. 
Docket No. 6000 (1953); Anchor Serum Corp., F.T.C. Docket No. 5965 (1954), affd. 
(7th Cir. 1954) 217 F. (2d) 867. · 
29 REPORT 164. 
30 REPORT 165. 
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The committee's recommendation finds a sympathetic ear here 
because it shows a more realistic understanding of the competitive 
process than did Congress perhaps in superimposing the new Robin-
son-Patman concepts on the old Sherman and Clayton Acts. The 
fact remains, however, that, in 1936, Congress added to the well 
known injury criteria of "substantial lessening of competition" and 
"tendency to monopoly," a third criterion of whether the effect may 
be to "injure, destroy or prevent competition with" grantors or re-
cipients of favored treatment. The committee may argue for realistic 
interpretation of this addition in the light of Sherman and Clayton, 
or may straight-facedly argue that the prepositions "with" and "to" 
are quite different (i.e., that injury to my competition with you is 
quite different from injury to me), and it may say that predatory price 
cutting must be set aside as an isolated exception to its basic inter-
pretation, but, still, Congress, in 1936, must have thought something 
new had been added.31 If the committee is right, Congress was mis-
taken and did not add anything new. It simply used new and differ-
ent words to say "substantial lessening of competition" and ''tendency 
to monopoly," the two things it had been saying since 1914. 
Despite the committee view, it would seem that the legislative 
history and the cases support the narrower inquiry as to injury under 
Robinson-Patman and that such an inquiry does not consist in many 
fact situations with basic antitrust policy. Consistency may not be 
necessary or advisable, but inconsistency should be recognized for what 
it is before that question can be determined. 
But if the committee has no trouble with competitive injury, it 
is concerned over the Federal Trade Commission's enforcement poli-
_cies once it has found an illegal price discrimination. It notes with 
regret a tendency by the commission to throw the entire book at a 
respondent even though he has been found to have violated only one 
chapter. It thinks "that Commission orders, indiscriminately pro-
scribing all differentials regardless of amount, necessarily impede de-
sirable flexibility in pricing."32 . 
The committee is straining a bit to protect respondents in advance 
against the consequences of future pricing conduct which neither 
can quite predict. The Ruberoid case33 would appear to have greatly 
31 That it did, see S. Rep. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d sess. (1936); H. Rep. 2287, 74th 
Cong., 2d sess. (1936). 
32 REPORT 168. 
33 Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 72 S.Ct. 800 (1952). 
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clarified the scope of the commission's orders in that it held the 
statutory qualifications and defenses against illegal discriminations 
to be "necessarily implicit in every order issued under the authority 
of the Act, just as if the order set them out in extenso."34 The com-
mittee, of course, approves this decision but wants the commission 
voluntarily to go further by affirmatively indicating areas in which 
the future conduct of the respondent would not be subject to attack. 
This, it would seem, injects a new and much more far-reaching idea 
of the commission's function in Robinson-Patman Act cases than is 
urged in any other part of the committee's Report. The commission 
has shied away from such a role in advance of proceedings and has 
viewed it with horror once a proceeding is successfully underway. 
Given the commission's presently accepted way of doing business, the 
Ruberoid case would seem to provide a satisfactory clarification of the 
scope of its orders. If more than that is sought by the committee, 
it might well have recommended comprehensive legislative redefini-
tion of the functions and operation of the Federal Trade Commission. 
3. The Cost Defense 
Cost justification under the act, an affirmative defense written 
directly into the basic price discrimination section, has been a mirage, 
and the committee very ably documents the fact. In nineteen years, 
this defense has twice succeeded completely and twice partially. In 
seven other recorded cases it has failed summarily.35 And unquestion-
ably the futility of it has, in many other cases, persuaded respondents 
to accept consent orders. 
Having recognized how complex the problem is and how excessive 
the demands on a respondent to make this defense, only, in all prob-
ability, to have it rejected, the committee has had great and under-
standable difficulty in coming up with any solution. It recommends 
the adoption of "realistic standards acknowledging the inadequacies 
inherent in accounting measurements of price"; it recommends "recog-
nition that a Robinson-Patman cost defense is not susceptible to testing 
by precise or mechanical rules"; it recommends "that a rea~onable 
approximation of production or distribution cost variances to price 
differentials-when demonstrated in good faith through any authorita-
tive and sound accounting principles-suffice"; and it recommends 
"statutory change" only in the event that administration in this man-
34 Id. at 476. 
35fuPOR'l' }71, DD. 142-145. 
1084 MmmGAN LAw REVIEW [ Vol. 53 
ner "proves unfeasible."36 When the smoke has cleared, it seems ap-
parent that the committee has conceded, in effect, that it doesn't exactly 
know what to do about the defense, except that the Federal Trade 
Commission ought to be "reasonable" about it and less strict in inter-
preting it. 
Most attorneys, who have represented a respondent before the 
commission in a case of this kind, will wholeheartedly support such a 
suggestion, but it is doubtful that the committee in this respect has 
been able to make any very considerable contribution. The act pro-
vides such a defense. How to make it available remains a question. 
Perhaps a patch of blue sky lies in the fact that the Federal Trade 
Commission also recognizes that it is a very real problem and, in 
consequence, has appointed a distinguished advisory committee to 
seek the answer. 
4. Quantity Limits Proviso 
The "quantity limits proviso" places a potential roof over cost 
savings resulting from economical quantities even where a cost defense 
might have been established. The proviso has been invoked by the 
Federal Trade Commission just once and that proceeding is presently 
under judicial review.37 Accordingly, there is no authoritative law 
on the subject. 
The committee condemns it for "ineptly sanctioning a crude form 
of price fixing by administrative fiat where competition should safe-
guard the public interest." The fact that the commission has seen 
fit to invoke the proviso only once in nineteen years indicates that 
it plays no basic part in the commission's work. And most lawyers 
will agree with the committee: ''We believe that any rational anti-
trust policy must leave the American business community free to 
explore new methods of distribution."38 
5. "Changing Conditions" Exemption 
The "changing conditions" proviso of section 2(a) has arisen in 
only two reported cases.39 It sought to exempt certain transactions 
such as (but not limited to) distress sales under court process or in 
36RJ,pQRT 174-175. 
37Quantity Limit Rule 203-1, 17 FED. Rl3c. 113 (Jan. 4, 1953). See B. F. Good-
rich Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (D.C. Cir. 1953) 208 F. (2d) 829. 
38 lli3PORT 177. 
39 Frederick W. Huber, Inc. v. Pillsbury Flour Mills Co., (D.C. N. Y. 1939) 30 
F. Supp. 108; Moore v. Mead Service Co., (10th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 540. 
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discontinuance of business which might otherwise be vulnerable as 
price discriminations. 
Since no particular light has been thrown on the proviso by the 
courts or the Federal Trade Commission, the committee has tried its 
own hand. It notes that while the proviso cites specific examples, 
each of which reads on the "marketability of the goods concerned," 
to confine its scope simply to deterioration of the seller's goods or 
business position would be to ignore the equally prominent statutory 
phrase "changing conditions affecting the market." It concludes, 
therefore, that a broader and more logical interpretation would be to 
apply it to all transactions which reflect "a spontaneous shift in market 
conditions beyond the seller's control."40 Here, as always, the com-
mittee is concerned with the actual state of the market and protection 
of the seller's Hexibility in it. Its thesis makes for a logical and equitable 
interpretation. 
6. The "Good Faith" Meeting of Competition Defense 
It is in its treatment and interpretation of this defense that the 
committee's underlying Sherman Act philosophy becomes most ap-
parent. It feels that if the defense were not absolute, it would be 
a victory for soft Robinson-Patman Act competition over hard Sherman 
Act competition; that if victory there must be, it should go the other 
way. But, as in other instances, the committee believes that reconcilia-
tion by administrative and judicial interpretation can be employed to 
obviate the need for legislative change. 
The Standard Oil decision41 provides direct support for the com-
mittee's basic position in this area, since it clearly held that, at least 
under certain circumstances, the defense is absolute. But the com-
mittee quite accurately notes that the Supreme Court, in deciding 
that case on its own facts, provided no clear-cut guide for the applica-
tion of the defense to numerous other fact situations. The Court did 
not provide guidance as to (1) what constitutes a competitor's lawful 
price, (2) whether the defense is available in obtaining, as distin-
guished from retaining, a customer, (3) whether the defense applies 
to regular, as distinguished from sporadic, competitive differentials, 
( 4) whether there can be only dollar-for-dollar meeting, (5) pre-
cisely what constitutes "good faith," and many other questions. The 
committee finds further dissatisfaction in the fact that, much as has 
40R.EPORT 179. 
41 Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U.S. 231, 71 S.Ct. 240 (1951). 
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been the experience with the cost defense, "not a single seller in a 
recorded case to date has succeeded in finally justifying a challenged 
discrimination by recourse to Section 2(b )' s 'meeting competition' 
defense." 
Accordingly, while the committee "approves the result of the 
Standard Oil decision as consonant with the nation's antitrust policy," 
it feels that the absolute defense must be available in a variety of other 
situations untouched by the Court's opinion. "Anything less," the 
Report states, "would move the price discrimination statute into irre-
concilable conflict with the Sherman Act."42 
The committee would, for instance, give a businessman the bene-
fit of the doubt on the question of whether he knew he was meeting 
a lawful price. It would not confine him to sporadic or isolated meet-
ing of competition but would give him flexibility "to cope with com-
petitive pressures so long as they exist." It would not hold him to 
exact dollar-for-dollar meeting of competition but would allow him 
to be the law's typical "reasonable -and prudent person." It would 
make the defense quite as applicable to the obtaining of new cus-
tomers as to the retaining of old. In short, it would apply a form of 
Rule of Reason in every situation, and "since the statute may be pres-
ently interpreted as we propose, we do not consider legislative amend-
ment necessary now."43 
Others do-and in both directions. Several members of the com-
mittee dissent, not only from its suggested interpretive guides, but 
from the Standard Oil rationale. Their views are strongly shared by 
Senator Kefauver and a sizable group of senators and congressmen who 
have introduced, in the present Congress, an "equality of opportu-
nity" bill which would remove the absolute defense where the discrimi-
nation "may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a mon-
opoly ."44 Conversely, and since the Standard Oil decision, Senator 
Capehart and others have introduced bills which would codify and 
extend the Standard Oil rationale along the lines suggested by the 
comrnittee.411 
There is great fear among independent wholesalers and retailers that 
if the defense is to be administered as the committee suggests, it will 
42REPORT 181. 
48 REPORT 182-184. 
44 S. 11, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (1955) and H.R. 11, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (1955). 
45 H.R. 3949, H.R. 4824, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (1955). 
1955] ANnnusT Poucy IN D1sTRIBUTION 1087 
mark a return to pre-1936 days with the chains and other mass pur-
chasing organizations free again to exact preferential treatment from 
suppliers. As applied to such independent _wholesalers and retailers, 
the point seems well taken. And, in any event, it serves to emphasize 
the very philosophical conflict which the committee seeks to reconcile. 
If the law is to protect hard competition, it can hardly assure soft com-
petition at the same time. The conflict seems too basic and deep-rooted 
in the present antitrust structure to be capable of solution merely by 
partisan interpretation one way or the other. Whichever way our 
people would have it in the best economic interest of the country, the 
statutory language should be clarified. 
7. The "Brokerage" and "Proportionally EquaI" Allowances or 
Services Provisions 
The committee has had much less trouble with these provisions 
despite the fact that they are about as ineptly written as anything on 
our books today. Strangely enough, their very ambiguity and inconsist-
ency, as between themselves and as against other sections of the act, 
have led to clear judicial and administrative interpretation. Respond-
ents can disapprove of, but rarely disagree on, what they mean today. 
A. Brokerage. The committee finds that this provision has 
granted a preferred and monopolistic position to the "independent" 
broker, thus legalizing a form of discrimination right in the statute 
designed to outlaw it. Accordingly, the brokerage clause is at odds 
with "broader antitrust objectives," and the committee recommends 
legislation "to restore the original vigor of the exception 'for services 
rendered' in Section 2(c)," i.e., to make such payments available to 
all for services actually rendered. The committee believes that this 
would "revive that competition in the distribution process whose benefit 
the customer must now by law forego."46 
The view here is that there can be no question but that the broker-
age clause, as presently interpreted, is what the committee says it is. 
Again, however, if such payments are to be opened up to all corners, 
there can be justifiable fear by independent wholesalers and retailers 
of a return (mentioned above also in connection with the meet com-
petition defense) to pre-1936 days in which the chains and mass pur~ 
chasers were able to exact preferential treatment through hidden re-
bates and brokerage allowances. The committee is 1.J.!lquestionably 
46 REPOI\T 192-193. 
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aware of this but, on Sherman Act balance, would prefer aggressive 
competition in this area to protection of the favored few. 
B. Allowances and services. No legislation is recommended by 
the committee in the case of allowances and services. The committee 
sees no need for change in sections 2( d) and ( e) of the act, principally 
because "the allowances and services provisions, in our view, are be-
ginning to be administered in a workable way ."47 The committee's 
view is that, whereas the Federal Trade Commission in the past took 
an ostrich-like attitude toward the business difficulties inherent in 
complying with the "proportionally equal" requirements, it has re-
cently, in its Trade Practice Rules for the Cosmetics Industry and its 
opinion in the Soap cases,48 come above ground. Given this en-
couragement, the committee prefers further interpretive reform to 
legislation. 
Specifically, it deplores the present disparity under one statutory 
roof in the "consequences which attach to economically equivalent 
business practices." Price discriminations under section 2(a) are not 
proscribed unless they injure competition and cannot be justified. 
In contrast, proportionally unequal allowances are illegal per se. This 
sharp inconsistency (born, it is submitted, more of sloppy draftsman-
ship than design) should be eliminated by giving sections 2(d) and 
(e) a section 2(a) interpretation. While it is believed that these 
sections can and should be administered' consistently with the price 
discrimination objectives of section 2(a), they remain inconsistent 
and inept in their language. Legislative editing would seem still 
to be in order. 
8. The Buyer's Liability 
One of· the historical mysteries surrounding the Robinson-Patman 
Act is that section 2(£), which seeks to control the beneficiaries of 
price discrimination, was added at the last minute despite the fact 
that the growing and uncontrolled power of these beneficiaries in 
1936 was the principal concern of Congress. And despite its perti-
nence to the underlying purposes of the act, it has been seldom used 
and never authoritatively interpreted until the Supreme Court's Auto-
matic Canteen decision.49 The Court there established a double stand-
47 R:£:i>ORT 191. 
48 Lever Brothers Co., Proctor & Gamble Co., Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., F.T.C. 
Dockets Nos. 5585, 5586, 5587 (1954). 
49 Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 346 U.S. 61, 
73 S.Ct. 1017 (1953). 
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ard. Sellers or grantors of preferential treatment continue, under earlier 
decisions, to carry the burden of disproving illegality. But Automatic 
Canteen holds that a buyer, at least in so far as the cost defense is 
concerned, has no such burden; that the Federal Trade CommissioI?, 
must itself establish, as against him, the "knowing receipt of an illegal 
concession as the essential element of the buyer's offense." 
The committee merely notes and approves the Automatic Canteen 
decision in passing. It approves the Court's recognition of "the im-
perative necessity for preserving the legal freedom of buyers to engage 
in aggressive bargaining over price as basic to effectively competitive 
distribution."50 
This decision and the committee's approval of it are sound, given 
the premise that the text of the act must be reconciled "with the 
broader antitrust policies" of other antitrust legislation. But it may 
still be asked, in view of the history and the language of the Robinson-
Patman Act, whether Congress did indeed intend to create such a 
double standard with the more lenient half applicable to buyers. The 
committee correctly points out that the precise application of the 
Automatic Canteen interpretation "cannot yet be told." But there 
again appears to be room either for legislative reconciliation or a clearer 
legislative indication that "the broader antitrust policies" do not apply 
in this area. 
9. Criminal Prohibitions of Discriminatory Practices 
When the committee moves over to the criminal side of price dis-
crimination, it becomes less satisfied with interpretive reform. It can 
see nothing good or desirable in section 3 and recommends its repeal 
"as dangerous surplusage."51 
Much can and should be said for this view. The courts have 
been confused as to the constitutionality of section 3 and as to whether 
it is an antitrust law in the first place.52 There has never been a con-
viction undedt, and it has been rarely used by prosecuting authorities 
except as a throw-in with other charges. And, in the absence of gov-
ernment enforcement, it has been seized by private treble damage 
litigants not as a vehicle for crime prevention but of recoupment of 
actual damages plus enrichment through punitive damages. Treble 
damage litigation is, of course, authorized under the antitrust laws but, 
unlike the civil condemnation of price discrimination in section 2(a), 
50 REPORT 196. 
51 REPORT 201. 
52 See cases cited, REPORT 199-200, nn. 223-227. 
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section 3 provides no express defenses. The treble damage remedy is 
sufficiently extreme that it should not be available in an area to which 
the government itself gives short shrift. As the committee says, "it 
does not serve the public interest of antitrust policy." 
I 0. Functional Discounts and Delivered Pricing Practices 
A. Functional discounts. The classification of buyers and dis-
counting to them in accordance with their respective distributive serv-
ices presented no legal problem under the original Clayton Act or 
during the early days of the Robinson-Patman Act. During those years, 
wholesalers, jobbers and retailers were easily identifiable as separate 
links in the chain of distribution, each performing a well understood set 
of duties. In that state of things, functional discounts were generally 
regarded as lawful because of the lack of adverse effect on competition. 
However, since World War II, myriad forms of distributive or-
ganization have arisen which defy such simple classificatipn. There 
are specialists performing a narrow distributive service; there are in-
tegrated concerns doing the entire job from the manufacturer's to the 
consumer's door. The Federal Trade Commission soon attempted to 
untangle and subdivide the integrated distributor for discount pur-
poses. Thus, with seeming logic, it ruled that a distributor could 
receive a wholesaler's discount on goods resold to retailers, but only 
a retailer's discount on goods resold directly to the consumer, a test 
based on the nature, in each instance, of the distributor's resale activi-
ties as distinguished from his buying functions.53 
The committee breaks comparatively new ground in this area by 
concluding that "to relate discounts or prices solely to the purchaser's 
resale activities without recognition of his buying functions thwarts 
competition and efficiency in marketing." The short of it is that the 
committee would break with the commission's interpretation and, 
wherever the distributor "fulfills the wholesale function, by relieving 
his suppliers of risk, storage, transportation, administration, etc.," 
would allow him the wholesaler's discount on all purchases without 
regard to whether he thereafter resells to the consumer at retail. Other-
wise, the committee has it, the seller would be getting a free ride and 
"the free play of competitive forces" would be prevented.54 
The now familiar question arises whether such an interpretation, 
albeit in the Sherman Act interest, would not turn the clock back-
68Sherwin-Williams Co., 36 F.T.C. 25 (1943); Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 
(1945). 
54fuPORT 207, 208. 
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ward to the pre-1936 imbalance between the chains and independent 
wholesalers and retailers. Presumably, such an interpretation would 
promote increased integration in distribution and that may well be 
the order of the day, but again it may be questioned whether inter-
pretive reform is an adequate substitute for a re-expression by Congress 
as of today of what it seeks to accomplish under a price discrimination 
law. 
B. Delivered Pricing. For some years now, the antitrust lawyer's 
favorite parlor game has been to resurrect the supposedly dead and 
buried "mill net theory" in order to take another swing at it. The 
majority of the committee takes its swing, while a minority actually 
appears hopeful of reincarnation/iii The latter seems unlikely at present 
but, if not, it is well that the committee as a whole has realistically en-
dorsed delivered pricing as a lawful way of doing business, absent con-
spiracy. Its discussion of the development of the law in this area is 
extremely able, and the present Federal Trade Commission apparently 
shares its views. 
CONCLUSION 
The brief but frequent notation of dissenting views throughout 
the Report's chapter on distribution indicates that the committee did 
not reach its numerous conclusions without a vigorous backroom 
struggle. It has been thus among lawyers since 1936. And the mere 
but continuing presence of that struggle points up what the committee 
has done its best to smooth over-that there are glaring inconsistencies 
and conflicts within our antitrust structure. 
The committee has, in my judgment, performed its basic task 
admirably. This was to provide "a thoughtful and comprehensive 
study of our Antitrust Laws."56 Chapter IV is just such a study and 
contains within its brief compass of ninety-three pages a treasury of 
legal research in a very complicated field. 
It is not as clear that this particular chapter of the Report has pre-
pared "the way for modernizing and strengthening our laws."57 The 
55REPoRT 217-218. 
56 Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., announced this goal in an address on "Our 
Antitrust Policy" before the Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference on June 26, 1953. 
REPORT iv. 
57 Concurrently with Mr. Brownell's announcement of a national committee to study 
the antitrust laws, the President of the United States said that he hoped the committee 
would "provide an important instrument to prepare the way for modernizing and strength-
ening our laws to preserve American free enterprise against monopoly and unfair competi-
tion." REPORT iv. 
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committee has, in many areas, shied away from legislative recommend-
ations and instead urged interpretive reform according to its own 
lights. I find myself in agreement with its basic Sherman Act phil-
osophy and its antipathy to soft competition. But I cannot agree that 
laws which are said to need so much interpretive reform should be 
left as they are. Nor can I agree that interpretive reforms suggested 
by lawyers and economists should be substituted for a clearer legisla-
tive restatement of such antitrust controls as our people believe neces-
sary to the continuing prosperity of our distributive economy. 
